In light of the statements made today by several delegates about the professionalism and commitment of the experts of the OPCW Fact-Finding Mission in Syria (FFM), we have to say that we do not share these evaluations. We are aware that the FFM has been working in extremely complicated conditions. However, we, like several other delegations here, have quite a few complaints about the FFM’s operations.

First of all, the key priority is still to adjust the FFM’s methods to the norms and requirements of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). Unfortunately, this is currently not the case. It has become common practice for the FFM to conduct investigations by means of remote verification, without trips to the attack sites and based on material evidence provided by questionable sources, that is, from third-hand accounts.

We fully support our Syrian colleagues who have requested that the sphere of FFM’s operations be actualised. This should have been done long ago. Only by revising this basic document with due regard for accumulated experience will we be able to enhance the FFM’s efficiency. Until this problem is settled, we will have to speak again and again about unconvincing investigations. This is having a negative impact on the environment within the organisation and on its international prestige. I would like to stress once again that this criticism is not designed to discredit the FFM but to improve its operations and fully adjust them to the CWC and today’s realities.

As for the FFM’s reports, the latest document concerned the chemical weapons use allegation in Douma, Syria, on April 7, 2018. The Russian experts who visited the site, Syrians and a number of independent international experts expressed disagreement with the conclusions made following the investigation of that high-profile incident. In order to clarify the matter, we have requested assistance from the OPCW Technical Secretariat. We have asked for a closed-door briefing to be attended by every member of the team who was involved in investigating the circumstances of that incident at some point. It was imperative to do this because of the completely opposite views on the incident within the FFM itself. For example, it was said, with good reason, that the chemical attack was a fabrication, and that the chlorine cylinders were brought into the rooms by hand. Our request for a briefing was denied.

We also asked the Technical Secretariat to publish the material provided by three “independent” experts in the field of technical design, ballistics and metallurgy, from which the FFM has drawn its conclusions. This could show clearly if the arguments provided by the “independent” experts were sufficient to conclude in one case that “the structural damage  to  the  rebar-reinforced  concrete terrace  at  Location  2  was  caused  by  an  impacting  object  with  a  geometrically symmetric  shape  and  sufficient  kinetic  energy  to  cause  the  observed  damage,”  and in the other case, that “after passing through the ceiling and impacting the floor at lower speed, the cylinder continued an altered trajectory, until reaching the position in which it was found.”

Much to our regret, the Technical Secretariat rejected our request again. We did not ask for the names, nationality and/or any other personal data of these “independent” experts that could be used for their identification, to be disclosed. Therefore, we cannot accept the argument that our request was rejected to protect the identity of the experts attracted to investigate delicate cases.

The publication of technical documents, specifically, mathematical calculations, diagrams and charts, as well as computer modelling results, can in no way compromise the independent and objective work of experts free of any external interference. Any reference to the privacy policy is clearly unjustified here. This could arouse doubts as to whether such examinations were conducted at all. Refusal to make them public could be interpreted as an attempt to conceal this possibility.

We are worried not only about the above facts, but also about the procedure for investigating the incidents in which terrorist and extremist groups operating in Syria were reportedly involved. For example, we see no clear reason for drawing out the FFM investigation into the chemical attack staged by terrorists in Aleppo on November 24, 2018. Information about that incident was provided by the Syrian side. Almost a year later the CWC signatories have not received even a provisional report.

The FFM head has said that they are waiting for additional material from the Russian military. We would like to say that the Russian Defence Ministry has forwarded all available evidence of that chemical attack to the Syrian side, which has submitted it to the Technical Secretariat. We wonder what else should be done to bring this investigation to its logical conclusion.

Since I am running out of time, I would like to finish my statement with a call to the Technical Secretariat to start improving FFM operations. This definitely needs to be done without delay for the benefit of the OPCW.

Thank you, Mr Chairperson.

I ask you to circulate this statement as an official document of the 92nd session of the OPCW Executive Council.